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Intro -- À propos de Collection XIX -- Titre -- AVANT-PROPOS -- I - LE BOYCOTTAGE PRIMITIF -- II - LE POUVOIR ROYAL DANS LA TRADITION ET L'HISTOIRE -- III - UN COTÉ NÉGLIGÉ DE LA RELIGION GRECQUE -- IV - SINGULARITÉS DES PRÉCEPTES DE VISHNOU -- V - LES CONTES POPULAIRES DANS HOMÈRE -- VI - LES REVENANTS DANS LES SERMONS DU MOYEN-AGE -- VII - TRADITIONNISME DE L'ECOSSE -- Note au lecteur -- Page de titre de l'édition imprimée -- Copyright

Abstract
In this article, I offer a reinterpretation of late 20th-century 'neo-liberal' transformations of global economic governance. My argumentative foil is a macro-institutional interpretation of the post-1980s period in which neo-liberalism appears as programmatic institutional form and disciplinary formation. I argue that a second, and complementary, dynamic also needs to be taken into account – namely, the emergence and operationalization of a set of critical technologies for embedding practices of reflexivity within the state. I suggest, moreover, that attention to this dimension of neo-liberalization provides a new perspective on the present. I offer an interpretation of the current moment of transition as one in which a similar repertoire of neo-liberal techniques of reflexivization is, in a second iteration, being trained on the architecture of global economic governance itself.

AbstractOne of the most significant recent trends in global trade governance has been the increasing use of regulatory "reliance" arrangements as a significant element of trade alliances. Against this backdrop, an important set of questions are raised about how existing institutions of global trade governance – especially the World Trade Organization and international regulatory standards organisations – should respond. To what extent, and how, should such institutions facilitate reliance arrangements? And what role can they usefully play in overseeing and guiding their use? This paper begins to answer these questions through a focused case study of regulatory reliance in the agrifood sector. Four challenges are identified regarding the implementation of such arrangements: the high costs of establishment and maintenance; the lack of agreed and reliable assessment methodologies; the potential for arbitrary discrimination between trade partners; and the difficulties of dealing with regulatory change over time. In light of these challenges, the paper assesses the work of existing international organisations in governing reliance arrangements in the agrifood sector. The paper concludes with a number of preliminary suggestions as to how this architecture of global governance might be supplemented or harnessed to address some of the challenges posed by reliance arrangements.

ABSTRACT
An important context for contemporary trade frictions is the emergence, since the 1990s, of a wide range of new forms of market capitalism, of which China's hybrid market economy is the most significant. Institutional diversity of this kind is a source of strength and dynamism for the global trading system, but it is also the cause of very serious friction. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization system has dealt with this problem before, but the existing settlement regarding the legitimate boundaries of institutional diversity is under pressure and needs to be revisited. One concept that has been incorporated into World Trade Organization trade defence law (and elsewhere) to help draw these boundaries is the concept of the 'market distortion'. The concept can be a useful one, but it has so far been interpreted and applied with an inadequate appreciation of its serious conceptual and practical difficulties. The potential result is a system of trade defences targeted in a discriminatory and even punitive manner against heterodox institutional forms, in ways that may excessively disincentivize institutional experimentation. In response, this paper argues for an approach to the interpretation and application of this concept, which proceeds from an understanding of the institutionally embedded character of markets. This does not take the form of a readily available 'solution', but rather a messy and evolving set of legal techniques that, in the best case, can form the legal basis of a practical and justifiable approach to the tensions caused by institutional diversity. A toolkit of legal techniques of this kind clearly cannot take the place of a more foundational political settlement of some sort, but it is a necessary accompaniment to it, if we are to preserve the aspiration towards a genuinely non-discriminatory and rules-based global economic order.